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THE GHOST OF 
THE UNIVERSAL 
SPECTATOR
Nina Sosna
the civil contract of photography 
by Ariella Azoulay. New York: 
Zone Books, (2008) 2012. Pp. 585; 
8 color, 100 black-and-white 
photographs. $36.95 cloth, $22.95 
paper.
This book is not really about pho-
tography as a certain type of visual 
image. Rather, it proposes to con-
sider photography politically, with 
both words stressed, consider and 
politically (although the move to-
wards the political sometimes takes 
the form of poetic expression). This 
does not mean, however, that Ari-
ella Azoulay sees the political in the 
content of the photograph or that 
the political (in the photograph) 
can be analyzed from a visual 
perspective: the black-and-white 
photographs collected in the book 
are quite restrained and even visu-
ally modest while still containing 
something ambiguous and trouble-
some. For example, in one photo 
a woman is led by the hand—
whether she is being helped and 
supported or compelled to move is 
unclear (301). In another, a dozen 
men sit on the ground with their 
eyes bandaged (360). What do they 
expect to happen? Are these pho-
tos taken in a war zone? No, these 
photographs do not illustrate the 
“state of exception.” The problem 
that arises in relation to these pho-
tos concerns what happens when 
the armies have gone, together with 
the nongovernmental peacemak-
ing organizations, the situation in 
which subjects (persons living in 
the governed territories in general 
and women in particular) are left 
to make their own decisions, when 
there is nobody to help and almost 
no resources available to improve 
their situation.
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Women (in general—African 
servants, photographed by own-
ers of the grounds; Eadweard 
Muybridge’s wife; a white Ameri-
can; Vietnamese women photo-
graphed by American soldiers; 
average women in “developing” 
countries who have been exposed 
to violence) and residents of occu-
pied territories: these are the two 
groups, which, for Azoulay, show 
how photographs can restore vio-
lated rights. In Azoulay’s view, if 
these photographs are displayed 
in a proper setting (a newspaper or 
gallery) and presented along with 
discursive evidence of the misery 
of a given situation, the claims that 
they make can effectively be trans-
formed from a cry for help into an 
enunciation—a call to action that 
cannot be ignored.
The women and noncitizens 
of occupied territories do not have 
rights as human beings or as citi-
zens, in general: even if women 
have gained ground in the realm of 
civil rights, this doesn’t seem to be 
as true about the field of represen-
tation: “It doesn’t matter what she 
does, what work she’s employed 
in, where she lives, where she goes, 
what she wears, or what she says—
ultimately, her presence there is for 
man” (265). Azoulay asks whether 
the “bare life” they are left with is 
worth living. The question is how 
to exist on the edge, in a constant 
state of anxiety and precariousness, 
when formally nothing is happen-
ing in the occupied territories, but 
every moment an act of violence 
might take place—any woman can 
be forced to do things she hasn’t 
agreed upon, any inhabitant of the 
occupied territory can be injured—
by a mistake or in the name of “pre-
vention.” In this situation, horror is 
not a horrible Horror, but silent, 
unseen, almost unrepresentable, al-
most omnipresent.
The book has an accusatory tone. 
Azoulay accuses us, passive readers 
and spectators, who sometimes say 
we have seen enough photographs 
from war zones and know what 
they look like and do not want to 
see more and, thus, do not want to 
help others in their desperate situ-
ations. Giorgio Agamben, too, is 
called to account for ignoring the 
extent to which citizenship is not 
something taken for granted—that 
it is dynamic because it has to be 
regained again and again through 
action. (This is to say nothing 
about Agamben’s blindness to the 
fact that women are excepted in a 
double manner—from the com-
munity of human beings and from 
the community of citizens.) Susan 
Sontag, too, is accused for regard-
ing the pain of others and claiming 
together with Donald Rumsfeld 
that torture is more serious than 
what is clearly sexual abuse (271). 
Roland Barthes is criticized for his 
insensitivity to the photographs 
that he deemed journalistic.
Rarely examining photographic 
material itself, Azoulay’s book is 
mainly engaged in debates and 
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discussions with the theories of fig-
ures such as Etienne Balibar, Ro-
land Barthes, Judith Butler, Jacques 
Lacan, Jean-François Lyotard, Gilles 
Deleuze, Giorgio Agamben, and 
Michel Foucault. Azoulay claims 
that a set of new conditions came 
into being with the advent of pho-
tography, but she is not always 
clear just what technical, theologi-
cal, magical, messianic, or medium 
changes characterize these new 
conditions, and what, precisely, is 
new about them. It also remains 
unclear why photography is given 
priority as the best means for the 
restoration of political representa-
tion, and what exactly the mecha-
nism of political change would be. 
What about other structures of rep-
resentation through which power 
flows?1 And in her polemics against 
Barthes, who is of course a neces-
sary reference point for any book 
on photography, the crucial point 
for Azoulay seems to be his will to 
remain alone, his being asocial. She 
writes that he wanted to be a citizen 
in the citizenry of photography, but 
that he did not have the passport 
(168). Is it Azoulay herself who de-
prives him of this citizenship?
Azoulay’s main objection to 
Barthes’s position as it is formulated 
in camera Lucida (1980) concerns 
his defense of the viewer’s ability 
to judge. In Azoulay’s interpreta-
tion, photography must respect 
Barthes’s physical and spiritual au-
tonomy and let him feel himself the 
master of his own judgment of the 
photo. This leaves no room for the 
viewer to be the real addressee of 
photography, instead becoming a 
scholar of its visual effects (130–70). 
But Barthes, one might point out in 
his defense, was trying to unravel 
the mechanisms of photographic 
affectivity and proposed his own 
experience as the basis for more 
general observations. In so doing, 
he was thereby speaking about his 
pain with others. We can see both 
Barthes’s and Azoulay’s arguments 
as focused on a mechanism acti-
vated by photography.
Azoulay’s other objection con-
cerns Barthes’s famous statement 
that photography shows something 
as it really existed in front of the 
lens of the camera. Quite often, the 
photograph is only a part of what 
really was or even the starting point 
of what really was. That is why the 
situation in which a photograph 
was made should always be recon-
structed: photography demands 
that other testimonies be added, 
visual as well as discursive. The 
contract, which is interwoven with 
photography as technology, comes 
into play, preventing technology 
from remaining only technology.
Here we see the concept that 
gives the book its title: the “civil 
contract of photography.” Devel-
oping Walter Benjamin’s ideas in 
her own way, Azoulay suggests 
that when we study the history of 
photography there is no real point 
at which we can say, “He is the in-
ventor of photography.” Neither 
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Nicephore Niepps, William Henry 
Fox Talbot, Louis Daguerre, nor 
Andre-Adolphe-Eugene Disderi 
could reasonably apply to play this 
role. Photography has no author 
(90–93). It cannot be someone’s 
property; it can only be “deposited” 
(as Azoulay puts it) for some period 
of time (103). A professional com-
munity stands as its source. The 
civil contract of photography was 
not a rational one; it was not made 
with a particular photographer but 
served as an expression of agree-
ment upon certain rules between 
the users of photography and the 
relation of these users to a camera 
(157).
This contract was the mission 
of those who happened to be users 
of photography (137). From that 
time on, the photographing per-
son gathers testimonies, but the 
photographic print should not be 
considered as the end result: pho-
tography is to be situated in an 
ongoing present, because the pho-
tographer can never know what 
really enters the photo and how it 
will later be seen. Having shown 
her injured legs to the lens of the 
camera, Mrs. Abu-Zohir lowers 
her skirt—but the photograph is 
not yet complete because “nothing 
has concluded, though the hour 
of photography has passed” (150). 
Only the viewers (or citizens of the 
citizenry of photography) can con-
struct the meaning of this photo, 
having accepted her address with 
all respectful responsibility. The 
fact that photography is “ready” 
only when it is being looked at is 
a sort of guarantee that the com-
mitment before the photographed 
person is to be fulfilled. The pho-
tographic image is irreversible. But 
even more important are the acts 
of others caused by this photo, and 
these acts are unpredictable. Azou-
lay underscores how the gesture of 
identification (this is Jerome—the 
brother of Napoleon) homogenizes 
the plurality of which photography 
is made and unites it into a stable 
invention, producing an illusion 
that we are dealing with a closed 
unit of visual information. As long 
as cameras exist, photographs will 
be taken by different people from 
different perspectives—and photos 
will be distributed, and this is the 
basis for a community (of citizens 
of the citizenry of photography).
Azoulay’s attempt here to 
describe the relations that exist 
around photography seems like an 
allusion to Jean-Luc Nancy’s com-
munism litteraire. As Nancy writes, 
“Community is given to us—or we 
are given and abandoned to the 
community: a gift to be renewed 
and communicated, it is not a work 
to be done or produced. But it is a 
task”2—a task of articulation, of 
communication through writing. 
But it appears that the citizenry that 
concerns Azoulay, who dedicates 
many pages to the literary analysis 
of declarations of civil rights, finally 
turns out to be virtual: “Against the 
political order of the nation-state, 
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photography—together with other 
media that created the conditions 
for globalization—paved the way 
for a universal citizenship: not a 
state, but a citizenry, a virtual citi-
zenry, in potential, with the civil 
contract of photography as its or-
ganizing framework” (134). In a 
sense, it does not exist at all: “As 
a matter of principle, and in the 
strictest sense of the term, under a 
regime in which hordes of nonciti-
zens live beside citizens, there are 
no citizens at all” (78). The argu-
mentation itself leads us to the con-
clusion that a future ideal would 
be the total representation of each 
and every person by her image, 
which might actually mean that 
human beings are not so necessary 
alongside their images. And these 
representations would be even fur-
ther multiplied by the exchange of 
photographs.
In order to consider this idea 
about the virtualization of com-
munication, it is useful to examine 
some of the other concepts, in addi-
tion to that of civil contract of pho-
tography, that Azoulay develops in 
her book. Although the civil rights 
pathos of the book seems quite ac-
cessible, its argument is sometimes 
obscured because its concepts are 
not defined or developed clearly. 
For example, there is a compli-
cated problem of how the political 
and economic enter the field of the 
image or become connected to it. 
Actually, Azoulay refers to differ-
ent economies as though they were 
all the same. The first we might link 
to the community theme, when an 
individual refuses her right to her 
image for the sake of being con-
nected to others, of being opened 
to their gaze. This economy of im-
ages (also referred to as economy of 
looks) concerns giving up one’s abil-
ity to defend one’s autonomic visual 
field from external forces (113). In 
understanding the “impossibility of 
maintaining a direct gaze between 
the spectator and the photograph 
and between the photographer and 
the photographed person” (376), 
we also see the moment when 
photography cannot show and the 
spectator cannot see. Photography 
is not a piece of paper but a space 
of relations.
But there is a second economy, 
which accounts for the spread of 
capital into the sphere of media. 
Azoulay is compelled to say that 
an equal relationship between 
the positions in the addressee-ad-
dressant-referent-meaning struc-
ture is hardly possible. The person 
photographed gets nothing in ex-
change except for being turned 
into an image (to be kept in some 
kind of archive). Moreover, per-
mission is often not asked of the 
photographed person, and she is 
photographed from a position that 
is not included in the frame, that 
is the privileged position of the 
viewer with a camera in his hands. 
That is the moment when the vio-
lence takes place; a “photorape” 
occurs (355). It is not a noncitizen 
124 NINA SOSNA
in front of us on the photo, the one 
who can be arrested at any time, 
the one who cries out for help by 
the very act of photography, but 
an abstract figure, a sign (Azoulay 
writes “icon”): a typical Palestinian 
without any private story, whose 
image can be used by a newspaper 
to illustrate its commentary. Hav-
ing written many slogans,3 having 
reconstructed cases of resistance 
through the means of photography 
(167–86), having repeatedly insisted 
on the supporting (though indirect) 
role of photography for those who 
have no voice to express their needs, 
Azoulay is nonetheless obliged to 
conclude that in most cases pho-
tographed persons are ghosts for 
the sake of which photos are being 
made and distributed; and a pho-
tographer, willingly or not, is made 
a part of the power that turns the 
photographed into ghosts. These 
photos, as usual, are channeled into 
the economy (and this is the second 
economy, the economy of capital, 
and not of the exchange of looks) of 
“the hit parade of images of horror” 
(306).
The unequal exchange contin-
ues. Not only is the photographed 
person being instrumentalized 
in media practices, but so too is 
the photographer himself. Pho-
tographers, mostly foreigners but 
sometimes also Palestinians, just 
hand their photographs over to 
international agencies, such as Re-
uters, and the “real distribution” of 
these photographs, if it takes place 
at all, leaves us with ghostly traces 
of the photographed and of the 
photographers.
What, then, is the effect of these 
two economies? If both the pho-
tographer and the photographed 
are victimized? If the encounter 
between the photographer and the 
photographed occurs in order to 
address someone else, who is not 
at the encounter (390)? If this final 
addressee, “hovering above the en-
counter between the photographer 
and the photographed person at the 
time the photograph is taken, is an 
effect of the act of photography” 
(391)—that is, does not exist in the 
traditional sense of the term?
We see here the difficult act of 
admitting the virtuality of this world. 
Let us consider Azoulay’s preferred 
modes of working with or through 
this problem. Her modes are retro-
spective looks on the events that do 
not exist anymore because they are 
out of media coverage, reconstruc-
tion (of the situation in which the 
photo was made), rehabilitation 
(thinking, for instance, about how to 
rehabilitate the citizenship of a spe-
cific body of governed [47]), another 
rehabilitation (photographs are the 
part of instrument for rehabilitating 
sensus communis [261]), activation 
(Michal Heiman as an artist “acti-
vates”  photographs—their activa-
tion causes them to lose what might 
have been thought to be their stable 
content), rediscovery (to find “the 
inconspicuous spot where in the 
immediacy of that long-forgotten 
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moment the future nests so elo-
quently that we, looking back, may 
rediscover it,” in Azoulay’s quota-
tion from Walter Benjamin [377]). 
In its critical activities, here, the book 
reveals that it is under a spell. It is 
preoccupied with the question of 
dealing with the past—a past from 
which ghosts have come to haunt 
the present, and these ghosts should 
also be also dealt with. And this re-
petitive re- shows the frequency of 
their appearance.
That is why the book is full of 
traces—traces of citizens, traces 
of past images of women that af-
fect them now, traces of the voices 
that ascribed magic to photography 
(voices that were opposed to pho-
tography in its simple operation 
instructions and its institutional-
ization [251]), and traces of identity 
remaining in the photograph (350). 
Azoulay writes,
The spectator employs the 
gestures of identification to 
banish the ghost [emphasis 
added] of the photographed 
person. . . . [T]he person 
in the photograph comes 
to life out of the picture, 
makes demands, activates, 
tries to pull strings, hovers 
in the air, commands, se-
duces, repels, troubles, and 
irritates. But she always also 
remains opaque, dumb, dis-
tant, locked in a space sepa-
rate from the surroundings 
of the spectator. (375)
No matter how much she insists 
on the positive aspects of the social 
relationships between the photo-
graphed and the photographer, 
no matter how much she repeats 
the positive possibilities offered 
by the contract between them, the 
language that Azoulay must rely 
on here itself reminds us that the 
reconstruction in question can do 
nothing with the fact that the photo 
shows us the trace not of a person so 
much as of a ghost.
 Ghosts and specters are used 
here not in Siegfried Kracauer’s 
sense, in which they were treated 
as holding funny and horrible fea-
tures simultaneously.4 But the cru-
cial point is that, for Kracauer, too, 
only the spectator’s intention can 
animate what is seen in a photo-
graph, and this animation would 
mean that we see it. That is why 
specters do not necessarily belong 
only to the past from which they 
appear over and over again. As 
Jacques Derrida has shown,5 re-
lations with specters might be a 
way to reveal slices/zones of life 
that were hidden or suppressed, 
which, with the help of specters, 
appear before our eyes. They help 
us to discover the gap—the spacing 
wherein the present does not corre-
late with itself. And this gap would 
be the source of some more life for 
us. That is why, if we now return 
to Azoulay’s argument, the pho-
tographer and the photographed 
person both need that “universal 
spectator” who has a strange mode 
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of existence, revealing himself in a 
kind of empty space, directly acces-
sible neither to the spectator nor to 
the person photographed. . . . So 
what we here have is a question 
of communication, however de-
layed but still finding a way to take 
place, here, through the mediation of 
photography. This communication, 
very human, is a part of the life 
that we share, and it seems more 
important than the abstract ques-
tion of citizenship. Further, what 
we may say about this life, what we 
may deliver to others about what 
we have seen, that would be more 
of a confession—like a confession 
that we have seen a ghost—than a 
judgment (which Azoulay seems to 
see as a kind of elite, personal act) 
or even less a report (which Azou-
lay views as an acceptable form of 
almost immediate violent reaction 
to what is seen, which certainly has 
the connotations of wartime).
Azoulay mentions the term con-
fession only once, when she writes 
about the impossibility of gazing 
directly at a photographed person. 
But what she writes some dozen 
pages later, is it not a confession, 
even a poetic one?
Without photographs, one 
can go insane. . . . There 
was someone else there, and 
sometimes it takes weeks to 
see the part of it that is the 
foreign presence, sometimes 
days, never immediately, at 
least an hour . . . but in the 
end, the silver iodide will 
burst into dance and disrupt 
the limits of the photograph. 
(411)
If it takes weeks, it is not a report. It 
is a sort of synthetic action, of cut-
ting and framing, of adding words, 
of printing, of discovering stories. 
And there are artistic practices of 
that kind, too, like Heimen’s, whose 
three projects the author takes as an 
example. These projects are not the 
work of a photographer but a work 
with photography—with photog-
raphy made by others. And this 
synthetic work is a way to confess 
the impossibility of staying alone 
with photographs, of seeing them 
alone. to be without photographs 
is to go insane, but then to be with 
photographs is then also quite a dif-
ficult and unpleasant thing. What is 
to be done then? One must share—
insist on making photographs and 
discussing them, writing whatever 
the circumstances. One must ad-
dress oneself to others.
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Notes
 1. It seems to be out of the question 
for the author that photography and 
citizenship are linked. For example, 
“Anyone who addresses others through 
photographs or takes the position of 
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photograph’s addressee, even if she is a 
stateless person who has lost her “right 
to have rights,” as in Hannah Arendt’s 
formulation, is nevertheless a citizen—
a member in the citizenry of photogra-
phy” (85).
 2. Jean-Luc Nancy, the inoperative com-
munity, ed. Peter Connor, trans. Peter 
Connor et al., Theory and History 
of Literature, ed. Wlad Godzich and 
Jochen Schulte-Sasse (Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press, 1991), 35.
 3. For example, “These collections of 
photograph-complaints would be 
worthless, however, if it were not for 
the citizenry of photography and its 
citizens” (132). Quite oddly, Azou-
lay writes, a few lines before, that 
“photography can be put forward and 
read as a nonmediated [sic] complaint 
attesting to situations in which citizen-
ship has been violated” (132); “It is im-
possible to photograph all the cases, but 
even if this were possible, there would 
be no one to look at all of them. But this 
technical impossibility to photograph, 
show or view does not mean photo-
graphs should not be taken” (314).
 4. Siegfried Kracauer, the Mass Ornament: 
Weimar essays, trans. thomas Y. Levin 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1995).
 5. See Jacques Derrida, spectres of Marx: 
the state of the Debt, the Work of 
Mourning and the New international 
(New York: Routledge, 1994).

